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Alliances, Acquisitions and Multinational Advantage
SARIANNA LUNDAN and JOHN HAGEDOORN
ABSTRACT This paper reviews recent empirical evidence to assess the implications of
alliance formation and increasing merger and acquisition activity of multinationals in the
context of the eclectic paradigm. Specifically, the paper will concentrate on the performance
implications of international expansion via alliances and mergers, and their relationship to
the so-called asset-augmenting foreign direct investment. It has been argued in the literature
that the way in which multinationals are able to build on their existing advantages and to
add to them by virtue of their international activities confers specific benefits to
multinationality. We argue that the growth of cross-border acquisitions and alliances as
modalities for international expansion has resulted from the continuing convergence of
value-adding capabilities within the Triad, and while such activity can help to augment the
asset base of the investing firms, it also has potentially anti-competitive implications.
Key words: Alliances; Mergers; Acquisitions; Multinationals; Performance.
JEL classifications: F23, L22, O3.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explore the rise of both strategic partnering activity as
well as mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by multinationals, and to assess to what
extent is such activity explained by reference to the OLI paradigm. This paper
consists of four main parts: in the first part we begin by briefly reviewing the
revisions to the eclectic paradigm and its theoretical underpinnings,  with particular
focus on the more recent revisions addressing the issue of alliances and the growth
in mergers. We then provide an overview of the theoretical literature seeking to
explain the rationale for the emergence of the alliance economy and the growth in
international  acquisitions. In the third part, we will review empirical evidence
concerning recent trends in alliance formation as well as mergers and acquisitions
in the world economy. In this context, we will also discuss the available evidence on
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the performance  implications of both trends, and how they affect our understanding
of the benefits of international production.
In the final part, we will discuss the ways in which the concept of ownership-
specific advantage needs to be amended to account for the benefits derived from
alliances where no ownership involvement is present. We will also discuss whether it
is appropriate,  in connection with alliance activity, to discuss the internalisation
benefits to the firm, given that externalisation  (the market alternative) is often
unavailable. Finally, we will discuss the locational variable in light of the growth in
mergers and acquisitions as well as alliances to assess whether acquisitions in
particular signify the growing importance of location-bound assets.
To counter criticism that the OLI paradigm is a static model of asset
exploitation, Dunning (1991) first introduced the dynamics of international
production as changes in the OLI configuration of firms over time. While the
general concept of changing OLI configurations went some way to introduce
dynamism into the paradigm, the increase in alliance and merger activity resulted in
the addition of strategic asset-seeking investment as the fourth generic motivation
for FDI (Dunning, 1993). Thus in addition to market and resource-seeking
investment, we now had efficiency-seeking  investment, which sought to improve on
the global allocation of resources of the multinational, and strategic asset-seeking
investment, which sought to add resources to the firm’s present capabilities.
In the two recent assessments of the paradigm (Dunning, 1995, 2000a) there is
a clear change in the focus of the argument, where the balance has shifted from the
exploitation of ownership advantages abroad to, first, improving the efficiency of the
existing configuration of activities and, finally, to the active acquisition of new
advantages. While market- or resource-seeking motivations will always characterise
some portion of investments, there is an increasing role for the efficiency-seeking
and strategic asset-seeking investment, which makes mergers and acquisitions as
well as strategic alliances critical to the asset-augmenting  FDI undertaken by
multinationals. This is accompanied by a renewed interest in the location of
production, and in particular in the stickiness of competitiveness-enhancing
resources (cf. Dunning, 1998). The predominance of created assets over natural
assets has made it possible for economies to converge not only in terms of GNP per
capita, but also in terms of their productive structure, while simultaneously it has
also created possibilities for the creation of more localised clusters or agglomera-
tions of innovative activity, leading to the emergence of newly desirable locational
assets.
2. Technology and Asset-Seeking Activity
It is argued here, that the liberalisation of markets and the consequent convergence
of productive capabilities within the Triad underlies the ability of multinationals to
source abroad not only complementary  assets, such as natural resources or cheaper
labour, but also technologically  intensive assets, similar to the ones they already
possess at home. Additionally, it will be argued in the subsequent section, that in
many instances the preferred, and possibly the only means of acquiring such assets
is either through mergers and acquisitions or by way of strategic alliances.
The fundamental changes in the global economy that have occurred in the past
two decades are largely a result of changes that have taken place when the world
characterised  by competition in static comparative advantages, such as natural
resource-based industries typified by the HOS model, is now characterised  by the
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accelerating pace of technological change, which induces competition to take place
essentially between created factor endowments. The perfect markets of the HOS
theory of international  trade do not exist, and instead we observe markets with
economies of scale, learning-curve  economies and oligopolistic competition.
Products do not necessarily become technologically  stable or standardised in the
mature phase of their life cycle, or at least the product is well in its maturity until the
pace of technological  change surpasses that of the change in the product design
itself. In fact, in the modern economy, the mature industries might face severe
pressures for a change in technology, and according to Abernathy et al. (1983), a
possibility of de-maturity as well.
Technology which contains a large tacit (i.e. non-codified, learning-by-doing )
component is non-transferable at arm’s length, and hence difficult to imitate
(Cantwell, 1991). However, as the technology matures (which need not take very
long), it can be reproduced if not in exact replicas, then at least in functional
equivalents by competitors,  and consequently the monopolistic advantages of the
innovating firm are eroded. To thwart this process, the firm needs to re-employ its
ownership-specific  advantages to produce a continuous stream of new innovations.
As Milberg and Gray (1992) have demonstrated, this `mandated re-investment’
requires a steady cash flow for a firm merely to keep up with the competition.
Firms that fail to accumulate the profits necessary to finance such investments
experience something akin to the vicious circle of poverty, whereby firms become
uncompetitive owing to their inability to invest in R&D, and unable to invest in
R&D on account of being uncompetitive and squeezed for profits. As Teece (1987,
1992) has suggested, it is necessary for firms to undertake not only investment in
R&D, but in complementary  assets as well to reduce the chances of appropriation
by free-riding parties (employees, suppliers, competitors). Still further support for
the need of private R&D is given by Franko (1989) who found that the R&D
intensity of a company, i.e. the proportion of revenues allocated to corporate R&D,
was the principal indicator of sales growth performance  in relation to its competitors
in the 5± 10 years following the investment.
Even for firms able to undertake such investments (perhaps through cross-
subsidisation within the firm), the magnitude of the expense imposes limits to
growth through greenfield investment or acquisition, and increases the attractive-
ness of joint ventures, minority ownership in subsidiaries and non-equity
cooperative alliances as modal choices. (Although the organisational costs arising
from a myriad such relationships are not often considered explicitly).1 In recent
years, the trend has been on one hand for foreign direct investment to be
undertaken through (very large) mergers and acquisitions rather than via greenfield
investment, while at the same time we have seen a concomitant trend of growth in
the numbers of non-equity cross border alliances, particularly  in knowledge-
intensive sectors (Gomes-Casseres,  1996; Hagedoorn, 1996).
While there are many reasons for firms to take part in various cooperative
arrangements,  such as risk reduction in oligopolistic competition, or the need to
establish a presence in all key markets, many explanations of cooperative behaviour
between firms have focused on the benefits derived from tapping into competitors’
competencies when the acquisition of such knowledge would be prohibitively
expensive through acquisition of full or partial ownership. When considered purely
in terms of cash flow constraints, joint ventures (JVs), minority ownership in
subsidiaries and non-equity cooperative alliances have become modalities that are
more attractive as many globally competitive firms have become squeezed for
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profits. Additionally, when considered from the perspective of the modern ` learning
organisation’ , these relationships, and the network structure of the firm (cf.
Thorelli, 1986; Powell, 1990) seem to have many of the benefits of ownership at a
substantially reduced cost.2
Considerable evidence has been accumulating on the internationalisation  of the
R&D activities of multinational firms since the 1980s (for a recent review see the
special issue of Research Policy edited by Niosi (1999), as well as Zanfei (2000) and
Cantwell and Piscitello (1999, 2000)). It appears that multinationals, particularly  in
the high-technology sectors, are engaging in asset-augmenting  FDI to exploit as
well as to build on their home-based competencies, as described by Dunning
(1995), Almeida (1996), Dunning and Lundan (1998) and Kummerle (1999). The
desire of the multinational to benefit from location-bound `centres of excellence’  is
mitigated by its ability to coordinate effectively the flows of knowledge within the
organisation.3 The research to date has investigated both the agglomeration
economies available in particular locations (e.g. Cantwell and Iammarino, 2000;
Santangelo, 2000) as well as the patterns of control and coordination within
multinationals from a range of home countries (e.g. Pearce, 1999; Zander,
1999).
3. Patterns of Alliance Formation and Merger Activity
If alliances and mergers essentially fill the same function in terms of the transfer and
acquisition of strategic resources, what accounts for the simultaneous growth in
both types of inter-firm relationships? In this section, we will review the existing
evidence of the sectoral and geographical  distribution of alliance activity, as well as
the (more limited) evidence on patterns of mergers and acquisitions. We will also
discuss the extent to which the empirical evidence points to similarities  or
differences in the use of alliances and mergers in the asset-augmenting  activity of
multinationals. The fact that both mergers and alliances can be used in a similar
manner to tap into other firms’  knowledge-based assets makes at least some merger
and acquisition activity arguably very similar to alliance formation in its
motivation.
The overall growth in alliances has been reported in a relatively large number of
studies, e.g. Mowery (1988), Mytelka (1991), OECD (1992) and Hagedoorn
(1996). Research based on historical data sets, such as the MERIT-CATI databank,
reveals that strategic technology alliances have become increasingly popular with
firms during the past few decades. Already during the 1960s, researchers from the
well-known Harvard Multinational Enterprise project found a number of inter-
national joint ventures that undertook substantial joint research projects (Hladik,
1985). At the time, this was rather puzzling for most researchers,  since international
joint ventures were generally interpreted in the context of market- and resource-
seeking activities, which excluded strategic technological assets. However, since the
1970s, we see an almost exponential growth in strategic technology alliances from
less than 50 strategic technology alliances founded each year during the mid-1970s,
to nearly 600 founded in the 1990s (Hagedoorn, 1996).
During this period of growth in strategic technology alliances, their sectoral
distribution appears to have changed as well. The increasing importance of high-
technology sectors, such as pharmaceutical  biotechnology, information  technology
and new materials, has affected the sectoral distribution of strategic technology
alliances. Gradually, these `new’  industries have increased their share in strategic
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technology partnering to close to 90% of all of the alliances established during the
1990s (Hagedoorn, 1996).
A similar concentration of alliance activity is found if one considers the
geographical  distribution of strategic technology alliances. Freeman and Hagedoorn
(1994) report that over 95% of all strategic technology alliances are formed between
companies from the developed economies, suggesting a straightforward relationship
between the degree of technological sophistication of an industry and the degree of
participation  of firms from less developed countries. Not surprisingly, the higher the
R&D intensity of the industry, the lower the participation  of companies from
developing and emerging economies, as such firms are seldom in possession of
knowledge-intensive resources that would be attractive to a Triad partner.
The sectoral and geographical  concentration of alliances is testament to the
underlying pattern of combining highly tacit capabilities with specific location-
bound assets. Research by Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) revealed strategic
partnering activity to be more evenly distributed between industrial sectors in more
technologically  advanced countries (R&D/GDP greater than 1%). Subsequent
research by Hagedoorn (1996) revealed that certain regions have attracted clusters
of international strategic technology partnering activity, such as in the case of the
large number of alliances between European pharmaceutical  companies and US
biotechnology companies, and the many long-term alliances between European
information  technology companies and semi-conductor  and software companies
from Silicon Valley. Additionally, although technology partnering is still dominated
by the developed economies, there is also some recent evidence that a small group
of Asian economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong) are gradually becoming
interesting partners for companies from the developed economies, also in terms of
their technology-intensive assets, particularly  in industries such as electronics and
related industries (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000).
Although firms of all sizes and different degrees of multinationality engage in
strategic alliances, the size of the firm (as measured by the number of employees)
was found to be an important factor in explaining the propensity of firms to form
alliances (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1995). Additionally, Hagedoorn (1995)
demonstrated that in most industrial sectors, large multinational corporations,
mostly those in the Fortune Global 500, are the most active alliance partners. A
network analysis of several sectors revealed that many of these multinationals are
`nodal’  players in networks of strategic alliances with a variety of alliance partners,
with domestic (uninational) firms playing a much more limited role.4 Furthermore,
the choice of contractual alliances or joint ventures is known to vary by sector, with
contractual alliances dominating the high-technology sectors (Osborn and Baughn,
1990), irrespective of the country of origin of either partner (Hagedoorn and
Narula, 1996).
As regards the sectoral and geographical  patterns of merger and acquisition
activity, unfortunately  the research to date has focused less on historical patterns,
and more on financial performance  before and after the merger, as well as on the
stock market reaction to merger announcements. Nonetheless, a small number of
studies do reveal some general patterns of activity. Overall, it seems that mergers
and acquisitions are disproportionately  concentrated in sectors other than high
technology, where strategic alliances are prevalent. Explanations offered by Ciborra
(1991), Oster (1992), Hagedoorn and Sadowski (1999) and Yu and Tang (1992)
refer to the need for (organisational) flexibility and the importance of learning, as
well as the speed of technological change for alliances in high-tech sectors, whereas
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formal and well-institutionalised  modes of control (i.e. mergers and acquisitions)
are most appropriate in more stable environments.
Data from the latest World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2000) reveal that cross-
border M&As have accounted for most of the growth in international production
over the past decade, even allowing for the differences in the way in which flows of
M&As and greenfield investment are calculated. In total, flows of M&As accounted
for 80% of all FDI in 1999. Less than 3% of mergers and acquisitions are actually
mergers, and full acquisitions account for two-thirds of the total, while minority
acquisitions are twice as common in the developing countries. Additionally, most
cross-border M&As take place between firms in the same industry, and hostile
mergers account for less than 5% of the total value.
Research by Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) also indicates that mergers and
acquisitions are still frequently preferred to alliances in the context of strategic asset-
seeking investments related to the organisation’s core activities. The extent to which
alliances and acquisitions are alike in their strategic motivations is contingent on the
question of the extent to which the resources sourced abroad are complementary  or
similar to the existing competencies of the acquiring firm. While the aggregate
evidence doesn’t typically reveal the extent to which alliances (or mergers) are
undertaken in the core of the company’s activities, an analysis by Mowery et al.
(1996) of the overlap in patenting activity of US and Japanese alliance partners
found that alliances can promote increased specialisation rather than a convergence
of capabilities between the partners, and that equity participation  promoted greater
knowledge transfer. This would suggest that alliances are a preferred means of
accessing complementary  resources, while equity participation  is more effective in
more closely related (and stable) fields of activity. Particularly in cases where the
acquisition is undertaken to gain the R&D capabilities of another firm, the primary
motivation in both mergers and alliances seems to be the possibility for learning and
knowledge transfer, and there is at least some evidence that the creation of a bi-
directional flow of information  in the context of an acquisition may be more
effective than in other forms of inter-firm relationships (see e.g. Bresman et al.,
1999).
It is suggested here that a precondition for these mergers is the underlying
convergence of productive capabilities within the Triad. If this is correct, we should
see high levels of intra-Triad M&As, whether international  or domestic, and few
mergers with firms outside of the Triad, particularly  in developing countries.
Indeed, the aggregate data from UNCTAD (2000) bear this out, as cross-border
sales and purchases by firms in the Triad accounted for 82% and 86% of the total
in 1999. The present boom is also accompanied by a boom in domestic M&As,
particularly  within the EU and US. While acquisitions of firms from developing
countries have been relatively rare, in 1999 they did account for 10% of total cross-
border sales, boosted by privatisation sales in Latin America and the `fire sale’  of
assets after the Asian financial crisis. Furthermore,  in Asia, regional investment
from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore has also played a role on the acquiring
side.
Two reasons for the parallel growth trends are proposed here, namely, the cash-
flow constraint favouring alliances over acquisitions, and the speed of acquisition
coupled with the possibility of more effective communication favouring acquisi-
tions. Another reason for the simultaneous increase might be that alliances act as an
introductory  stage to eventual mergers and acquisitions. However, evidence from
Hagedoorn and Sadowski (1999) indicates that alliances are not a gateway to
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mergers, since out of the nearly 13,000 instances of alliance formation in the
MERIT-CATI database (which focuses exclusively on technological  cooperation)
only 2.6% were converted into mergers over a 3-year period. According to their
evidence, not only are conversions from alliances to mergers rare, but they appear
to be seemingly random, as neither size nor country of origin had a significant
impact on the rate of conversion. We can thus conclude that while alliances and
acquisitions are distinct forms of inter-firm partnering,  they are often undertaken
with the same motivation of adding to a firm’s stock of knowledge-intensive
assets.
In the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2000) an analogy is made between
the merger wave in the USA 100 years ago, and the present situation in the world
economy, where high levels of technological and regulatory change are present.
Then as now, there is an aspect of consolidation as well as asset acquisition
underlying the desire to merge, prompted by rapid changes in the environment. If
the primary aim of a merger is the elimination of competition, the degree of
convergence of the underlying assets is of lesser consequence, and the availability of
financing as well as the degree of effective anti-trust legislation will act as constraints
on merger activity. If, on the other hand, the acquisition of assets, and in particular
knowledge-intensive assets, is the primary motivation for the merger, the productive
assets of both firms have to be similar enough for effective absorption to take
place.
There is also something of a time dimension to our argument, which suggests a
progression from a wave of domestic mergers to initial FDI via greenfield (fully or
majority-owned) investment, to be followed by joint ventures and minority
investments, and culminating in knowledge-seeking mergers and strategic alliances
in an integrated global economy. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to offer
conclusive evidence of this dynamic, a few examples can be given. The consolidation
of US and British industry by the early 1900s was followed by market- and resource-
seeking (greenfield) investment before World War II.5 In the post-war era, evidence
from Gomes-Casseres  (1988) for 1945 ± 1975 indicates a period of boom for joint
venture activity peaking in 1961, followed by a decline in joint ventures in restricted
as well as unrestricted  markets. If the interest shown in academic journals is
anything to go by, joint ventures seem to have been surpassed in importance by
alliances as we get to the mid-1980s, and we have already documented the rise of
merger and alliance activity in the past 20 years. While joint ventures still take place,
particularly  in (developing) countries where this form of investment can be required
or encouraged, cooperative activity is now equally likely to take place either as a
non-equity strategic alliance, or a minority stake in another firm.
To the extent that entry restrictions rather than the lack of knowledge about a
foreign market were an important reason for the emergence of joint ventures, as
such restrictions fade, joint ventures might come to represent a largely transitional
form of foreign ownership. Compared to the `pure’  modalities of non-equity
alliances and mergers, joint ventures are a half-way house involving some control
and some cooperation. Following the Buckley and Casson (1988) argument for
deciding on the merits of a cooperative form of business, the joint venture modality
seems to be inferior to both mergers and alliances. While a full merger naturally
exploits the benefits of full control, but comes at a price, a minority stake can buy
some access and influence as well as a share of any profit, without the complications
of starting a new venture. On the other hand, a non-equity alliance offers the full
benefit of cooperation without the burdens (or benefits) of control and ownership,
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which in the case of technology cooperation is thought to be antithetical to its
purpose in any case.
4. Re-examining the OLI-Variables
Increasing knowledge-seeking cross-border activity in the form of M&As and
alliances has necessitated a modification of the eclectic paradigm to emphasise the
distinction between asset-exploiting and asset-seeking activities. While there
remains an important role for market- and resource-seeking  investment, such as in
the case of China, for example, convergence of productive capabilities within the
Triad has created possibilities for firms not only to exploit their ownership
advantages abroad but also to absorb productive capabilities and to incorporate
them into their network of activities. There are two main ways in which the merger
(and alliance) activity of multinationals could affect their profitability; either by
increasing industry concentration and generating oligopolistic profits, as originally
envisaged by Hymer (1976), or by allowing the firm access to location-bound
knowledge resources and thus upgrading its competitive capabilities. In the
following sections we will examine how each of the OLI variables is affected by the
growth in cooperative relationships and increased merger activity.
4.1 Ownership-Specific Advantages
Although to an extent it is a matter of definition, we agree with Dunning (1995) that
the asset-related ownership-specific  advantages are not likely to change, at least in
the short run, as a result of co-operative behaviour by firms. However, looking at
asset-related ownership advantages (Oa) from the point of view of absorption rather
than dissemination, they form the basis on which other firms choose to collaborate
with the multinational, and are also a measure of its attractiveness as a partner.
We argued in the previous section that the choice of how to access the resources
or capabilities of another firm depends on number of factors. The cash flow
implications of an acquisition as opposed to a contractual alliance would favour the
latter in uncertain environments such as in the high-technology  sectors, where the
need to partner with a large number of firms is apparent. We also argued that
mergers might be preferred in areas of activity that are closer to the core activities
of the firm owing to the greater ability of the firm to integrate these activities within
the firm.
The transaction-related  advantages (Ot) of the multinational can be thought of
as the benefits of multinationality per se, and they will increase in magnitude with
increasing internationalisation.  Some of these benefits arise out of the ability of the
multinational to efficiently coordinate its activities across borders, which increas-
ingly also involves the ability to coordinate activities between firms. Particularly in
cooperative relationships, such managerial capabilities are inherently valuable. To
the extent that (large) multinational firms are likely to have better access to
managerial capabilities, and are likely to be in a position to partner with other firms
globally, multinationality itself will confer benefits over and above those enjoyed by
uninational firms.
In a recent contribution Dunning (2000b) has addressed the issues of
regeneration and exploitation of ownership assets with reference to relational assets
that are owned or accessed by a firm, and defined as a ` willingness and capability to
access, shape and engage in economically beneficial relationships . . . [that] take
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place both within the confines of a particular firm or between that firm and other
organisations’ . While this definition covers all of the modalities of international
business, relational capabilities are particularly  salient in the case of M&As and
alliances, where the firm’s ability to manage its boundary is critical. In the case of
mergers (acquisitions), this involves the creation of a new entity with a new culture,
or more commonly, the inculcation of the dominant culture in an enlarged
organisation. In the case of joint ventures, a new entity is created, making it similar
to the merger case, but it also shares with contractual agreements the problem of
having to rely on trust to manage beyond the scope of inherently incomplete
contracts.
In all three instances, the ultimate financial outcome seems to hinge on the
ability of the multinational to coax cooperation out of essentially reticent outsiders.
The literature is replete with examples of organisations that inculcate values of trust
and cooperation to their members, ranging from criminal networks like the mafia,
to business networks like those of the overseas Chinese, or indeed the bonds
between family members. In each case, cooperation from within is expected, while
cooperation from the outside needs to be gained through persuasion or coercion.
While mergers and acquisitions offer more opportunities  for coercion than joint
ventures or alliances, if the marriage-metaphor  of cooperative activity (e.g. Kanter,
1994) is to be believed, the firms that successfully manage their relational assets are
more likely to persuade than to coerce. In the end, successful persuasion works by
bringing the outsiders inside, since the more the partners share common values and
beliefs about the purpose of their collaboration, the more likely it is that they will act
in ways that benefit the partnership  rather than the individual firm.
4.2 Location
The sourcing of technologically  intensive assets is linked to the increasing
importance of locationally specific assets in areas such as Silicon Valley in California
or Silicon Glen in Scotland, where a specialised industry generates externalities  in
information  exchange and the creation of new knowledge. Research on the
institutional context supporting such areas, as well as on the effects of spillovers and
agglomeration economies of firms investing in a given area is substantial and
growing (e.g. Cantwell and Iammarino, 1998; Dunning, 2000; Cantwell and
Noonan, 2001). To the extent that such externalities  are specific to an area, they
offer a unique location-bound resource that can only be utilised by a local or
multinational firm. The access to such assets, whether possessed by other firms,
government sponsored research programmes,  or university-linked  institutions,
represents a resource for which no external market exists. Consequently, such assets
are liable to be sourced by a means either involving ownership, as in the case of
mergers and acquisitions, or non-equity linkages as in the case of strategic
alliances.
The access to specific geographically  dispersed resources can be taken to be a
benefit of multinationality, although at its core, it is a benefit of mobility (and size),
with multinationality being the consequence of the underlying geographical
distribution of such location-bound assets. Thus, for example, an American firm
investing in Silicon Valley is not reaping the benefits of multinationality, and neither
is an English firm investing in Silicon Glen, unless the devolution of Scotland results
in its separation from the UK, while clearly the profit-enhancing possibilities are the
same for them as they are for a French firm in either location.
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4.3 Internalisation
The internalisation  advantage in connection with the absorption of knowledge and
capabilities from abroad is a bit of a misnomer, as many such relationships are
characterised  by a minimal or entirely absent equity involvement. However, the
organisation of such relationships in a quasi hierarchy can provide benefits to the
firm beyond what is available in the marketplace.6 The critical constraint in this
context is the net cost, so that while in some cases an acquisition or merger might
be the preferred modality, the use of cooperative arrangements  within a quasi
hierarchy can yield similar benefits at a lower cost.
The advantages of close relationships can be better understood in terms of the
economies of common governance, i.e. in terms of the efficiencies and cost savings
obtained by working within a hierarchy. Drawing on Casson (1986) and Williamson
(1979), Gray and Lundan (1993) compiled five conditions in which a hierarchy
might contribute to internalisation  efficiencies in vertical production and horizontal
marketing and distribution relationships; their list has been amended here to fit a
more general context:
(1) the activity between units is large and recurring;
(2) there exist uncertainties  with respect to price, quantity and design of the
product or process sought;
(3) product-specific equipment will reduce costs but will expose both parties in an
arm’s length relationship to an unequal share of losses or gains when product
design and process technologies  change within the life of the activity-
idiosyncratic capital equipment;
(4) tight quality standards are imposed by the purchaser (the assumption here is
that costs of quality control are an increasing function of quality standards for
both firms or units so that elimination of one round of quality control will
engender greater cost savings);
(5) when one party owns production relevant proprietary  expertise so that the
appropriability  is increased by an internal transfer.
While all five conditions would favour the choice of hierarchy over market, or the
internalisation  of the transaction, the prohibitively high cost of internalising  all such
transactions has led firms to pursue other solutions. The rise of quasi-hierarchical
governance structures can thus be seen in the emergence of network arrangements
between corporations, particularly  in the research and development area. Multi-
national corporations have increasingly come to realise, that to overcome the market
failure associated with R&D activities, a reciprocal arrangement between corpora-
tions with no equity involvement and no formal (long-term) contractual relationship
will spread the costs and enable the MNE to take on R&D that otherwise would not
be feasible.
However, the creation of corporate networks in the form of strategic alliances
and (non-equity) partnerships  entails costs to the participants  separate from those
ordinarily experienced in the marketplace or those induced by the government.
Powell (1990) points out at least two such costs for participating  MNEs in a
network configuration. First, as networks are based on a reciprocal pattern of
communication and exchange, the preferred option for participants  is often one of
creating indebtedness and reliance over the long haul to reduce uncertainty of
termination  of participation  in the network. Second, dependence and particularism
in member selection are characteristics  that serve to restrict access to the network
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after the initial formation. As the costs of monitoring network activities can be
substantial, stability and trust in the network setup becomes a critical management
challenge.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have reviewed recent evidence of the growth in alliances and
acquisitions and analysed their effects in terms of the OLI paradigm. We present
evidence indicative of a changing dynamic, whereby multinationals (within the
Triad) are moving from the dissemination and exploitation of ownership advantages
to the attraction and absorption of competitive advantages abroad. These changes
can be accommodated within the OLI paradigm, by making explicit the two-way
flow of resources, and effectively creating a mirror image of the original variables.
The eclectic paradigm can thus explain not only the ability of the multinational to
exploit its advantages abroad, but it can also be used to describe the essential
elements that would allow the multinational to access and acquire advantages
abroad to sustain long-term growth.
We suggest (without being able to offer conclusive evidence) a progression from
domestic mergers to initial foreign production via greenfield investment, to be
followed by joint ventures and minority investments, and culminating in knowledge-
seeking mergers and strategic alliances. This dynamic is made possible by the
increasing convergence of the underlying knowledge-based assets as a result of
globalisation, enabling firms ultimately to undertake cross-border cooperative
activity either in the form of mergers, minority ownership or through strategic
alliances. The primary benefits of multinationality potentially linked to profitability
are argued to be the ability of the multinational to combine mobile investment with
location-bound assets, as well the pool of talent available to the multinational to
manage such assets. However, increasing global industry concentration as a result of
the growth in cross-border mergers also evokes old concerns about the true
advantage of multinationality lying in oligopolistic profits.
The patterns of partnering activity present a picture of concentration, both in
terms of a sectoral concentration in high technology, as well as a geographical
concentration within the Triad. However, underneath the aggregate patterns lie two
trends worth noting: the persistence of contractual agreements to acquire and
develop knowledge intensive assets; and the trend of internationalisation  of the
R&D activities of the multinational. The persistence of contractual R&D agree-
ments can be seen as evidence of the development of a new type of transaction-
related ownership advantage by multinationals related to knowledge acquisition.
The internationalisation  of the R&D function is partly related to new ways of
developing knowledge within the firm (and between firms), but it is also related to
tapping into location-bound sources of expertise found abroad. Both (non-equity)
alliances as well as acquisitions can be used to develop and acquire new resources,
and warrant a closer examination as related activities in the value creation process
of multinationals.
Notes
1. For example, Arrow (1974) focused on how the concentration of information at the top of the
organisation both helps to economise on information while also setting limits to its effective
dissemination.
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2. It should be noted, that we are discussing two types of networks: a hybrid type of firm that combines
elements of hierarchy and market (quasi hierarchy), and network as the pattern of (voluntary)
connections between participants, e.g. at a research consortium.
3. See also Holm and Pedersen (2000).
4. See also D’Cruz and Rugman (1993) on the role of the multinational as a flagship firm.
5. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that mergers in one period and alliances
in another did not necessarily take place in the same industries.
6. Even if information asymmetry or contractual difficulties make it unlikely that some types of
information will be exchanged over the market, the market for corporate control still exists, and can
be used at least in principle to acquire such benefits.
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